False Advertising by Rhodes, Andrew & Wilson, Chris M
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
False Advertising
Andrew Rhodes and Chris M Wilson
Toulouse School of Economics, School of Business and Economics,
Loughborough University
14 December 2015
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/68869/
MPRA Paper No. 68869, posted 17 January 2016 05:49 UTC
False Advertising
Andrew Rhodes and Chris M. Wilson∗
14th December 2015
Abstract
There is widespread evidence that some ﬁrms use false advertising to overstate the
value of their products. Using a model in which a policymaker is able to punish such
false claims, we characterize a natural equilibrium in which false advertising actively
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1 Introduction
Buyers are often reliant on ﬁrms to obtain information about product characteristics. To
exploit this, some ﬁrms deliberately engage in what we call false advertising - the use of
incorrect or exaggerated product claims. They do this in a range of diﬀerent contexts and
despite potential legal penalties1. Recent policy cases include Dannon which paid $21 mil-
lion to 39 US states after it misled consumers about the health beneﬁts of its Activia yogurt
products, and Skechers which paid $40 million after falsely stating that its toning shoes
helped with weight loss. Similarly, in a related example, Volkswagen is now facing a poten-
tial multi-billion dollar penalty after cheating tests in order to make false claims about its
emission levels2. Additional evidence of false advertising also comes from academic research.
Such studies carefully document the existence of false advertising and its ability to increase
demand3.
However, despite the existence of false advertising, the theoretical literature has largely
restricted attention to truthful advertising. In this paper, we develop an equilibrium model of
false advertising where false advertising can actively inﬂuence rational buyers. Tougher legal
penalties reduce the incidence of false adverts, but also increase their credibility. As a result
of the latter eﬀect, we show that stronger penalties can reduce buyer and social welfare.
In particular, the paper derives conditions on demand and market parameters such that
a policymaker optimally uses a low penalty to permit a positive level of false advertising.
We then consider several wider issues including investment incentives, and the potential
optimality of industry self-regulation.
In more detail, Section 2 introduces our main model where a monopolist is privately
informed about its product quality. While we later extend the results to an arbitrary number
of quality types, we initially focus on the case where quality is either `high' or `low'. The
policymaker ﬁrst commits to a penalty for false advertising. Then having learned its type, the
ﬁrm chooses a price and makes a (possibly false) claim about its quality. Buyers subsequently
update their beliefs and make their purchase decisions, before the policymaker instigates any
1In the US, most federal-level regulation is conducted by the FTC which punishes oﬀenses with various
public measures, including possible monetary penalties. In Europe, most countries employ varying levels
of industry self-regulation alongside statutory regulations. For instance, in the UK, most regulation is
conducted by the industry-led Advertising Standards Authority. It is endorsed by various governmental
bodies, which have the power to issue ﬁnes.
2For further details, see http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2010/12/dannon-
agrees-drop-exaggerated-health-claims-activia-yogurt, http://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/press-releases/2012/05/skechers-will-pay-40-million-settle-ftc-charges-it-deceived, and
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-34324772. Accessed 12/14/15.
3Zinman and Zitzewitz (2014) and Cawley et al (2013) examine ski resorts and over-the-counter weight
loss products respectively. See also Mayzlin et al (2014) for false advertising in the form of fake user reviews.
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penalties. We believe this set-up closely approximates many important markets and contexts
where buyers are unable to verify claims, or can only do so after a long time, and where
policy plays a key role in regulating advertising.
Section 3 characterizes a natural equilibrium where the high type advertises truthfully
but where the low type may engage in false advertising. This equilibrium oﬀers some useful
methodological contributions by smoothly unifying several, otherwise separate, cases of ad-
vertising. Firstly when the policymaker's punishment is large, there is no false advertising.
Here, advertising is akin to veriﬁable disclosure as assumed within the standard literature.
Secondly when the punishment is small, the low type always conducts false advertising. In
this case, advertising is eﬀectively cheap talk and is therefore unable to inﬂuence buyers'
prior beliefs. Finally though, when the punishment is moderate, our equilibrium involves a
novel form of partially veriﬁable advertising. Here, the low type engages in false advertising
probabilistically by mixing between i) pooling with the high type, with a false advert and a
relatively high price, and ii) advertising truthfully, with a relatively low price. Hence, after
observing a high claim, buyers rationally increase their quality expectations beyond their
priors even when the claim is false, as consistent with the empirical evidence detailed above.
Section 4 uses this `smooth' equilibrium to analyze how marginal changes in the level
of punishment aﬀect a variety of welfare measures. We ﬁrst consider buyer surplus. Here,
a reduction in the punishment increases the probability of false advertising and generates
two opposing eﬀects. The ﬁrst `persuasion' eﬀect harms buyers by prompting them to buy
too many units of a product at an inﬂated price. This is akin to a formalization of Dixit
and Norman's (1978) classic eﬀect of persuasive advertising - but our eﬀect derives from
a change in rational buyers' beliefs, rather than an unmodeled change in their preferences.
The second eﬀect derives from the impact of false advertising on damaging the credibility of
claims. Understanding the impact on credibility goes back to at least Nelson (1974) and is
well-documented empirically (e.g. Darke and Richie 2007). However, instead of viewing this
impact as detrimental, we stress its beneﬁts under a novel `price' eﬀect whereby it counteracts
market power by lowering buyers' quality expectations and prompting lower prices.
To compare these two eﬀects, we then utilize some recent methods on demand curvature
and cost pass-through (Weyl and Fabinger 2013). However, rather than focusing on cost
changes, we consider the impact of changes in (expected) quality on price, which we term
as `quality pass-through'. In many cases, we show how the persuasion eﬀect dominates such
that buyer surplus is maximized by eliminating false advertising. However, we also formalize
a range of other cases where the price eﬀect dominates, including those where ex-ante product
quality is high. Here, the optimal penalty is softer so as to induce a positive level of false
advertising in a way that is weakly superior to a blanket ban on false adverts or an outright
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prohibition of low quality products.
Next, we turn to the eﬀect on proﬁts. Unsurprisingly the low (high) type always prefers
smaller (larger) punishments. Interestingly however, ex ante, the monopolist weakly prefers
strong punishments to eradicate false advertising so that it can price more eﬀectively under
high quality. Hence, if the monopolist could commit, its choice of punishment would coincide
with that preferred by buyers in many circumstances. This oﬀers potential support for
Europe's use of self-regulation. However, for other circumstances, in contrast to the view
that self-regulation may be too soft, the monopolist's preferred punishment is too strong
relative to buyers'.
Lastly, we consider total welfare. Here, an increase in the probability of false advertising
leads to two diﬀerent eﬀects. On one hand, false advertising lowers the credibility of any
high claim and so prompts any type with such a claim to reduce its output. However, on
the other hand, false advertising also allows the low type to expand its output. We then
document a range of cases where this latter output expansion is beneﬁcial and dominates
the former eﬀect, such that a positive level of false advertising is welfare optimal.
Section 5 extends the main model to consider the additional eﬀects of false advertising
when product quality is endogenous. This is an important issue to consider because false
advertising may reduce product quality investment by limiting the available returns from
high quality products. However, while we conﬁrm that such an `investment' eﬀect prompts
the policymaker to select a weakly higher penalty, we further show how a positive level of
false advertising can remain optimal for buyer and social welfare. In addition, once quality
is endogenous, we also show how an increase in the penalty can raise the probability of false
advertising.
Finally, Section 6 considers some robustness issues. First, we allow for an arbitrary num-
ber of quality types. Qualitatively the analysis remains the same as for the two-type case
except now the policymaker must also decide which types can engage in false advertising.
We show how false advertising can remain optimal for types with `moderate' quality. Sec-
ond, we i) let the ﬁrm types vary in marginal costs, and ii) allow for more complex forms of
punishment. In both cases, the resulting equilibrium and policy results remain qualitatively
robust after making stronger requirements on buyer beliefs. Third, we examine a competitive
context where an incumbent faces an entrant with private product quality. We demonstrate
an equilibrium with false advertising that is qualitatively similar to monopoly, and document
parameter regions where a policymaker optimally permits positive levels of false advertising..
Related Literature: The advertising literature typically focuses on truthful advertising (e.g.
Anderson and Renault 2006, Johnson and Myatt 20064). In earlier work, Nelson (1974) of-
4See also the comprehensive literature reviews by Bagwell (2007) and Renault (2015).
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fered a seminal discussion of false advertising and how regulation may increase its credibility.
However, since then, false advertising has only been considered by some very recent papers.
Some papers assume that buyers are naive and so believe all claims (e.g. Glaeser and Ujhelyi
2010, Hattori and Higashida 2012). Here, false advertising can be socially optimal to oﬀset
the output distortion from imperfect competition. A diﬀerent set of papers, including some
within marketing, introduce heterogeneous buyer tastes so that claims can gain credibility by
forfeiting revenues from some buyers (e.g. Chakraborty and Harbaugh 2010, 2014). Other
papers study credibility from legal penalties in ways more related to our paper. Piccolo
et al (2015) examine a duopoly where ﬁrms have diﬀerent qualities. They focus only on
fully pooling and fully separating equilibria, and ﬁnd that buyer surplus is maximized with
zero penalties to induce full pooling by making the ﬁrms non-diﬀerentiated. In contrast we
consider a richer class of semi-pooling equilibria where false advertising can inﬂuence buyers'
priors. By establishing a diﬀerent price mechanism related to the credibility of advertising,
we then show how penalties can optimally take a variety of levels depending on demand and
market conditions. Like Piccolo et al, Corts (2013, 2014a, 2014b) only considers fully pooling
and fully separating equilibria with exogenous product quality. However, he takes a diﬀerent
focus by allowing ﬁrms to choose whether or not to learn their own quality, and shows that
ﬁnite penalties can be optimal to induce socially-valuable unsubstantiated claims. Finally,
in more distant work, Barigozzi et al (2009) study false comparative advertising, and Drugov
and Troya-Martinez (2015) analyze false advice where ﬁrms can also choose the vagueness
of their claims.
Our paper also oﬀers insights to a number of other areas. First, it adds to the growing
literature on the economics of consumer protection policy which focuses on other topics,
such as high-pressure sales tactics (Armstrong and Zhou 2014), the mis-use of commissions
(Inderst and Ottaviani 2009), and refund rights (Inderst and Ottaviani 2013). Second,
our model relates to number of communication papers that study equilibrium lying and
persuasion under full rationality (e.g. Kartik 2009, and Kamenica and Gentzkow 2011). In
contrast, we study policy-related lying costs within a speciﬁc advertising context, where a
third-party inﬂuences not only the amount of information that is communicated to buyers
but also indirectly the price that they pay. Third, by allowing for non- or partially veriﬁable
claims, we provide some alternative insights into the literature on veriﬁable information
disclosure (e.g. Dranove and Jin 2010, Daughety and Reinganum 2008, Celik 2014). Even
when disclosure costs are zero, our results imply that i) full veriﬁable disclosure is not always
socially optimal, and ii) a ﬁrm's ex ante choice of disclosure can be socially excessive.
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2 Model
Amonopolist sells one product to a unit mass of potential buyers. The monopolist is privately
informed about its product quality q. Speciﬁcally, the product is of low quality L with
probability x ∈ (0, 1), and of high qualityH with probability 1−x, where−∞ < L < H <∞.
Average ex ante quality is then deﬁned as q¯ = xL+(1−x)H. For our main analysis we assume
that marginal costs are independent of quality and normalized to zero. Each buyer has a
unit demand and values a given product of quality q at q + ε, where ε is a buyer's privately
known match with the product. This match is drawn independently across buyers using a
distribution function G(ε) with support [a, b] where −∞ ≤ a < b ≤ ∞. The associated
density g(ε) is strictly positive, continuously diﬀerentiable, and has an increasing hazard
rate.
The monopolist sends a publicly observable advertisement or `report' r ∈ {L,H} at no
cost, where a report r = z is equivalent to a claim Product quality is z. The binary
report space is without loss because there are only two ﬁrm types and reports are costless. A
policymaker is able to verify any advertised claim, and impose a penalty φ if it is false.5 False
advertising is deﬁned as the use of a high quality report r = H, by a ﬁrm with low quality
q = L. The policymaker can costlessly choose any level of punishment, φ ≥ 0, in order
to maximize one of three possible objectives: buyer surplus, total proﬁt, or total welfare.
Any punishments that involve a ﬁne go straight to the policymaker, and are not used to
compensate buyers.
The timing of the game is as follows. At stage 1 the policymaker publicly commits to
a penalty φ for false advertising. At stage 2 the monopolist privately learns its quality. It
then announces a price p and issues a report r ∈ {L,H}. At stage 3 buyers decide whether
to buy the product, taking into account φ as well as the ﬁrm's price and report. Finally at
stage 4 the policymaker veriﬁes the advertised claim and administers the punishment, φ, if
it is false. The solution concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). All omitted proofs
are included in the appendix unless stated otherwise.
3 Equilibrium Analysis
3.1 Benchmark with Known Quality
As a ﬁrst step, consider a benchmark case in which the ﬁrm is known to have quality q.
Quality claims are then redundant because it is weakly optimal for the ﬁrm to use truthful
5We can also interpret φ as an expected penalty if claims are only veriﬁed probabilistically.
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advertising. An individual buyer purchases the product if and only if ε ≥ p − q such that
demand equals D(p − q) = 1 − G(p − q). The ﬁrm then chooses its price to maximize
p [1−G (p− q)], and so:
Lemma 1. Suppose the ﬁrm is known to have quality q, and deﬁne q˜ = −b and q˜ =−a+ 1/g(a). The ﬁrm's optimal price, p∗(q), is increasing in q and satisﬁes:
p∗(q) =

0 if q ≤ q˜
1−G(p∗(q)−q)
g(p∗(q)−q) if q ∈
(
q˜, q˜
)
a+ q if q ≥ q˜
(1)
When q ≤ q˜, quality is so low that the ﬁrm would make zero sales even if it priced atmarginal cost. The market is inactive, and we normalize the ﬁrm's price to zero without loss.
When instead q ∈ (q˜, q˜), the ﬁrm optimally sells to some but not all buyers such that p∗ (q)satisﬁes the usual monopoly ﬁrst order condition. Finally if q ≥ q˜, quality is so high that
the ﬁrm optimally sells to all potential customers by pricing at the willingness-to-pay of the
marginal buyer, a + q, such that the market is `covered'. However, for some distributions,
q˜ =∞ and so this ﬁnal case is redundant. Henceforth to avoid some uninteresting cases, let
q¯ > q˜ (or q¯ + b > 0) such that a product of average quality always has some positive value.Our later analysis will consider how the optimal price varies with quality, and we will
sometimes refer to dp∗(q)/dq as `quality pass-through'. Firstly for q ∈ (q˜, q˜), after diﬀeren-tiating the ﬁrst order condition:
dp∗(q)
dq
=
1− σ(p∗(q)− q)
2− σ(p∗(q)− q)) , (2)
where σ(ψ) = −[1 − G(ψ)]g′(ψ)/g(ψ)2 is the curvature of demand (see Aguirre et al 2010,
and Weyl and Fabinger 2013). It then follows that dp∗(q)/dq ∈ [0, 1) because our assumption
of an increasing hazard rate implies that D(p− q) is logconcave in price, such that σ(ψ) ≤ 1.
Intuitively, an increase in quality q produces a parallel outward shift in the inverse demand
curve, and the ﬁrm optimally responds by both charging a higher price and by selling to
strictly more buyers.6 Secondly, where appropriate, when q ≥ q˜ quality pass-through is one.
The equilibrium proﬁt earned by a ﬁrm of known quality q can be written as
pi∗(q) = p∗(q) [1−G (p∗(q)− q)] . (3)
6Weyl and Fabinger (2013) note that the optimal price change from any outward unit shift in inverse
demand (such as an increase in quality within our model) equals one minus cost pass-through.
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It is straightforward to show that pi∗ (q) is increasing and convex in q given that g(ε) has an
increasing hazard rate. Finally, buyer surplus can be expressed as
v∗(q) =
ˆ b+q
p∗(q)
[1−G (z − q)] dz. (4)
Observe that v∗ (q) = 0 when q ≤ q˜ because no buyer purchases the product, but that buyersurplus is positive and weakly increasing in q > q˜. We further discuss the shape of v∗(q) inSection 4.1 below.
3.2 Privately-Known Quality
Henceforth we assume that the ﬁrm is privately informed about its quality. As is typical
in signaling games, there exists a large number of PBE because buyers can attribute any
oﬀ-path claim or price to the low type. However, standard reﬁnements like D1 have little bite
in our game.7 Therefore we approach equilibrium selection as follows. Firstly, we restrict
attention to PBE in which the high type always makes a truthful claim. This allows us to
focus on the low type's incentives to engage in false advertising. Secondly, we restrict buyer
beliefs to depend only on the ﬁrm's claim and not on its price. In particular, conditional on
observing a high claim, we assume that buyers expect quality qeH ≡ E (q|r = H) irrespective
of price, such that both types optimally charge p∗ (qeH). Intuitively, after making a high
claim, the payoﬀ functions of the two types diﬀer only by the punishment φ due to their
common marginal cost. Hence, buyers should expect the two types to price in the same way,
and so avoid making any price-based inferences. A more formal justiﬁcation for this second
restriction can also be obtained by using Mailath et al 's (1993) Undefeated Equilibrium
reﬁnement.8 We may then state:
7In particular there are many equilibria with r(H) = H that are consistent with D1. To see why, note that
a high type earns φ more than a low type i) on-path in any pooling, semi-pooling, or least-cost separating
equilibrium and ii) following a report r = H and any oﬀ-path price. Hence D1 does not restrict beliefs
following a report r = H and an oﬀ-path price.
8In particular, suppose buyers believe that on average a ﬁrm reporting r = H has quality qeH . Consider
how buyers should update their belief upon seeing r = H and some price p. It turns out that D1 again has no
bite. However the Undefeated Reﬁnement i) is consistent with our second restriction that E (q|r = H, p) =
qeH , and ii) uniquely selects the price p
∗ (qeH) as the price which the ﬁrm should charge after reporting r = H.
Note that by applying the reﬁnement in this way, we assume that buyers interpret any oﬀ-path price as
a (possible) signal of a ﬁrm's type rather than as a signal about E (q|r = H). Other recent uses of this
reﬁnement include Gill and Sgroi (2012), Perez-Richet and Prady (2012), Miklos-Thal and Zhang (2013) and
Lauermann and Wolinsky (2015).
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Proposition 1. Suppose a high type always reports truthfully, and buyer beliefs depend only
on the ﬁrm's claim. There exists a unique PBE (up to oﬀ-path beliefs9), in which:
i) A high type claims r = H and charges p∗(qeH).
ii) A low type randomizes. With probability y∗ it claims r = H and charges p∗(qeH). With
probability 1− y∗ it claims r = L and charges p∗(L).
- When φ ≤ φ1 ≡ pi∗(q¯)− pi∗(L), y∗ = 1
- When φ ≥ φ0 ≡ pi∗(H)− pi∗(L), y∗ = 0
- When φ ∈ (φ1, φ0), y∗ ∈ (0, 1) and uniquely solves
pi∗(qeH)− φ = pi∗(L), (5)
where qeH =
xy∗L+ (1− x)H
1− x+ xy∗ . (6)
iii) Buyer beliefs are Pr (q = H|r = L) = 0 and Pr (q = H|r = H) = 1−x
1−x+xy∗ .
Proposition 1 characterizes a natural equilibrium where false advertising can arise. A
high quality ﬁrm always reports truthfully and charges p∗ (qeH). With probability y
∗, a low
quality ﬁrm pools with the high type by falsely claiming r = H and charging p∗ (qeH), and
with remaining probability 1 − y∗ it reports truthfully and charges p∗ (L). Therefore when
buyers observe a report r = L, they correctly infer low quality and demand D (p∗ (L)− L)
units, such that the ﬁrm earns pi∗ (L). On the other hand when buyers observe a report
r = H they update their expectations about quality to
qeH =
xy∗L+ (1− x)H
1− x+ xy∗ ≥ q¯ > L,
where for brevity we omit the dependence of qeH on y
∗. Consequently by using false adver-
tising, a low quality ﬁrm can persuade rational buyers to overestimate its product quality,
and earn pi∗ (qeH) − φ. However such false advertising never systematically deceives buyers
because their beliefs are correct on average due to the additional possibility that the high
report comes from a high type.
The precise equilibrium characterization depends smoothly on the size of the punishment
φ. Firstly if φ ≤ pi∗(q¯)−pi∗(L) the equilibrium has full pooling. The punishment is suﬃciently
low that false advertising is a dominant strategy for the low type, and hence y∗ = 1. Buyers
discount any high advertised claim and maintain their prior such that qeH = q¯.
Secondly if φ ≥ pi∗(H) − pi∗(L) the equilibrium has full separation. The punishment is
suﬃciently high that truth-telling is a dominant strategy for the low type, and hence y∗ = 0.
9Note that when φ < φ1 the claim r = L is oﬀ-path, and a range of beliefs Pr (q = L|r = L) lead to the
same equilibrium play.
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Advertising is perfectly informative and claims are fully credible such that qeH = H. The
ﬁrm earns its full information proﬁt.
Finally and most interestingly, if φ ∈ (φ1, φ0) the equilibrium is semi-pooling. Here, the
equilibrium has two novel features. First, the low type makes a false claim with strictly
interior probability y∗ ∈ (0, 1), where y∗ satisﬁes equation (5) to ensure that the low type
is indiﬀerent between lying and telling the truth. Randomization is an essential feature of
this equilibrium because the punishment is too high to support full pooling and too low
to support full separation. Second, unlike the full pooling equilibrium, false advertising is
partially informative and therefore prompts buyers to actively update their beliefs beyond
their priors, with qeH ∈ (q¯, H).
4 The Eﬀects of Policy
First consider the eﬀects of policy on the level of false advertising, y∗. By using equations
(5) and (6) it follows that:
Lemma 2. The level of false advertising y∗, is continuous and weakly decreasing in the level
of punishment φ.
Stronger policy smoothly increases the informativeness of advertising. When φ > φ0 or
φ < φ1, a low quality ﬁrm has a strict preference for truth-telling or lying respectively, and
so small changes in φ have no eﬀect. However when φ ∈ [φ1, φ0], the probability of false
advertising y∗ satisﬁes the indiﬀerence condition (5) and is strictly decreasing in φ from 1
to 0. Intuitively, to maintain indiﬀerence of the low type as φ increases, high reports must
become more credible. Since buyers are Bayesian, this is only possible if y∗ is strictly lower.
4.1 Buyer Surplus
We now consider the eﬀects of policy on a variety of welfare measures, starting with buyer
surplus. Using Proposition 1 we can write expected buyer surplus as
E(v) = x(1− y∗)
ˆ b
p∗(L)−L
(L+ ε− p∗(L)) dG(ε) + xy∗
ˆ b
p∗(qeH)−qeH
(L+ ε− p∗(qeH)) dG(ε)
+(1− x)
ˆ b
p∗(qeH)−qeH
(H + ε− p∗(qeH)) dG(ε). (7)
In words, with probability x(1− y∗) the ﬁrm sends a low report and charges p∗(L). Buyers
correctly infer low quality, buy if ε ≥ p∗(L) − L, and so receive L + ε − p∗(L). Then with
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probability 1 − x + xy∗ the ﬁrm sends a high report and charges p∗(qeH). Buyers update
their beliefs according to equation (6), and buy if ε ≥ p∗(qeH) − qeH . With conditional
probability xy∗/ (1− x+ xy∗), the product is low quality, and buyers receive L+ ε−p∗(qeH).
With conditional probability (1− x)/ (1− x+ xy∗), the product is high quality, and buyers
receive H + ε− p∗(qeH). After collecting terms and using the deﬁnition of v∗(q) in equation
(4), the above expression simpliﬁes as follows, where E(v) is just a convex combination of
v∗(L) and v∗(qeH).
E(v) = x(1− y∗)v∗(L) + (xy∗ + 1− x)v∗(qeH). (8)
We now exploit the smooth feature of our equilibrium to investigate the eﬀect of a
marginal increase in the penalty φ, under the following regularity condition on demand
curvature:
Assumption 1. Let z(ψ) = −σ′(ψ)+[2−σ(ψ)]g(ψ)/[1−G(ψ)]. The demand function satisﬁes
either i) q˜ < ∞ and z(ψ) > 0 for all ψ ∈ (a, b), or ii) q˜ = −∞, q˜ = ∞, z(ψ) changes fromnegative to positive at exactly one value of ψ ∈ (a, b), and limψ→a σ(ψ) = −∞.
Assumption 1 is satisﬁed by a wide class of demand functions, and ensures that v∗(q) is
s-shaped in quality. For convenience, we denote
qˆ = sup
{
q ∈ (q˜, q˜) : z(p∗(q)− q) > 0
}
(9)
as the ﬁnite quality level at which v∗(q) changes from being strictly convex to concave. As-
sumption 1i is satisﬁed by a rich class of demands that exhibit constant curvature, which
includes linear and exponential demand (see Bulow and Pﬂeiderer 1983). Here qˆ = q˜ such
that v∗(q) is strictly convex for all q ∈ (q˜, q˜), but independent of quality and equal to´ b
a
[1−G (z)] dz when q > q˜. Alternatively, Assumption 1ii is satisﬁed by many demands
with increasing curvature - including those derived from the Normal, Logistic, Type I Ex-
treme Value and Weibull distributions. For these demands qˆ solves z (p∗(q)− q) = 0, and
v∗(q) is strictly convex for q < qˆ but strictly concave for q > qˆ. Further details are provided
in Section A of the Supplementary Appendix.10 We can then state:
Lemma 3. Consider φ ∈ [φ1, φ0] and suppose that Assumption 1 holds.
i) If L < qˆ expected buyer surplus is quasiconcave in φ. For any given L there exists a
threshold q˙(L) ≥ qˆ, such that expected buyer surplus is strictly increasing in φ if qeH < q˙(L),
10This appendix may also prove useful for other wider literatures. For instance, a recent literature on the
welfare eﬀects of third-degree price discrimination uses a restriction related to Assumption 1 which ensures
that buyer surplus is convex with respect to marginal cost (e.g. Cowan 2012 and Chen and Schwartz 2015).
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but strictly decreasing in φ if qeH > q˙(L).
ii) If L > qˆ expected buyer surplus is weakly decreasing in φ.
Lemma 3 shows that buyers do not always beneﬁt from tougher penalties. In particular,
a well-intentioned policy that increases φ may actually reduce expected buyer surplus. To
understand why, recall that the level of false advertising y∗ is a decreasing function of φ, and
note that an increase in y∗ produces two eﬀects. On the one hand, buyers are more likely
to receive a false advert and so be persuaded to buy a low quality product at an inﬂated
price p∗(qeH) > p
∗(L). On the other hand, the increase in lying damages the credibility of
advertising. This reduces buyers' expectations and induces any product with a high claim
to set a lower price. In more detail, one can write
∂E(v)
∂y∗
= x [v∗ (qeH)− (qeH − L)D (p∗(qeH)− qeH)− v∗(L)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
`Persuasion' eﬀect
− (1− x+ xy∗)D(p∗(qeH)− qeH)
∂p∗(qeH)
∂qeH
∂qeH
∂y∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
`Price' eﬀect
. (10)
The ﬁrst term is a `persuasion' eﬀect. Conditional on the ﬁrm having low quality (which
occurs with probability x), a marginal increase in lying replaces the surplus that the buyer
would have received if the ﬁrm had told the truth, v∗(L), with the surplus associated with
false advertising, v∗ (qeH) − (qeH − L)D (p∗(qeH)− qeH). To explain this latter surplus, note
that after observing a high report, buyers update their beliefs to qeH , and expect to receive
a surplus v∗ (qeH). However since quality is low, each of the D (p
∗(qeH)− qeH) units bought
is worth qeH − L less than anticipated. This harms buyers by prompting them to pay too
much and to potentially buy too many units of a low quality product, as represented by the
shaded area in Figure 1. The eﬀect formalizes the loss in buyer surplus caused by persuasive
advertising as identiﬁed in the seminal paper by Dixit and Norman (1978). However, our
false advertising `persuasion' eﬀect arises from a change in rational buyers' beliefs, rather
than an unmodeled change in their preferences.
The second term in (10) is a `price' eﬀect. A marginal increase in y∗ lowers the probability
that a high claim is true. This reduces buyers' conﬁdence in high reports, and lowers their
rational expectation of the relevant product quality, ∂qeH/∂y
∗ < 0. While this eﬀect on
credibility is typically thought to be detrimental, little attention has been paid to its potential
beneﬁts. In particular, with the probability that the ﬁrm uses a high claim, 1− x+ xy∗, the
reduction in credibility lowers the ﬁrm's market power and prompts a price reduction.
Lemma 3 can now be understood in terms of our two eﬀects. First consider L < qˆ. Here,
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Figure 1: The Persuasion Eﬀect of False Advertising
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1−G(p∗(L)−L)
p∗(qeH)
1−G(p∗(qeH )−qeH)
1
1−G(p−qeH )
1−G(p−L)
P
Q
the persuasion eﬀect dominates when qeH < q˙(L), whilst the price eﬀect dominates when
qeH > q˙(L). Hence a stronger policy beneﬁts buyers in the former situation, but harms them
in the latter. The critical threshold
q˙(L) = sup
{
qeH :
∂E(v)
∂y∗
< 0
∣∣∣∣L < qˆ} (11)
is examined in more detail within the proof. There we show that for demands within As-
sumption 1i, q˙(L) = qˆ, while for demands within Assumption 1ii, q˙(L) is strictly decreasing
in L and satisﬁes limL→qˆ q˙(L) = qˆ. Second consider L > qˆ. If the distribution satisﬁes As-
sumption 1i, the price and persuasion eﬀects cancel such that ∂E(v)/∂φ = 0. Intuitively the
market is fully covered irrespective of the ﬁrm's claim, and buyers pay either a+L following
a low claim, or a+ qeH following a high claim. The average price paid is therefore a+ q¯ which
is independent of φ. However if instead the distribution satisﬁes Assumption 1ii, the price
eﬀect strictly dominates such that ∂E(v)/∂φ < 0.
We now consider the optimal level of punishment, φ∗. To ease exposition, we henceforth
focus on the (more interesting) case where L < qˆ. Recalling Lemma 3, we ﬁnd that:
Proposition 2. Fix L < qˆ and suppose that Assumption 1 holds. The buyer-optimal penalty,
φ∗, is characterized as follows:
i) When H ≤ q˙(L), φ∗ ≥ φ0 such that y∗ = 0 .
ii) When q¯ < q˙(L) < H, φ∗ = pi∗(q˙(L))− pi∗ (L) such that y∗ = (H−q˙(L))(1−x)
(H−q˙(L))(1−x)+q˙(L)−q¯ ∈ (0, 1).
iii) When q˙(L) ≤ q¯, φ∗ ≤ φ1 such that y∗ = 1.
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Proposition 2 provides a range of demand and parameter conditions where a buyer-
oriented policymaker refrains from eradicating false advertising. Recall from Lemma 3 that
for L < qˆ, a marginal decrease in false advertising increases buyer surplus if and only if buyers
are relatively pessimistic about high claims, with qeH < q˙(L). Therefore when H ≤ q˙(L)
buyer surplus is globally decreasing in y∗ and the policymaker optimally eliminates false
advertising. However when q¯ < q˙(L) < H buyer surplus follows an inverted-U and peaks at
a y∗ ∈ (0, 1), such that the optimal penalty tolerates some false advertising. Finally when
q˙(L) ≤ q¯ buyer surplus is globally increasing in y∗ and so the policymaker fully permits false
advertising.
The fact that a positive level of false advertising can generate a higher buyer surplus than
under full information (where y∗ = 0) gives several policy implications. First, any instinctive
per se implementation of strong punishments or blanket prohibitions on false advertising
may actually limit buyer surplus. Second, the optimal use of advertising punishments is
superior to an outright ban on low quality products. Such a ban only generates a surplus
E(v) = (1− x)v∗(H), which is weakly less than the surplus under full information.
Finally, we further detail the conditions under which positive false advertising is optimal.
Corollary 1. Given Assumption 1 and L < qˆ, the buyer-optimal level of false advertising is
increasing in L, H, and (1− x).
When product quality levels are higher, or when the probability of a high type is larger,
policy should allow a higher level of false advertising, y∗. Intuitively, when the monopolist's
product quality technology is relatively `healthy', the expected quality from a high claim,
qeH , is relatively high such that the price eﬀect becomes relatively more powerful. On the
contrary, when the product quality technology is less `healthy', the persuasion eﬀect becomes
particularly damaging.
4.2 Proﬁts
We now examine the eﬀect of policy on proﬁts. To begin, consider each individual ﬁrm type:
E (piL) =
pi∗(q¯)− φ if φ < φ1pi∗ (L) if φ ≥ φ1 and E (piH) =

pi∗(q¯) if φ < φ1
pi∗ (L) + φ if φ ∈ [φ1, φ0]
pi∗(H) if φ > φ0
(12)
This is explained as follows. When φ < φ1 the equilibrium has full pooling such that each
type earns pi∗(q¯), but the low type also incurs a penalty φ. When φ ∈ [φ1, φ0] the low type is
indiﬀerent between lying and truth-telling, and so earns pi∗(L). The high type, meanwhile,
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earns pi∗(qeH) which is equal to pi
∗(L) + φ from (5). Finally when φ > φ0 the equilibrium has
full separation, and so each type earns its full information payoﬀ.
Remark 1. An increase in φ reduces E (piL), but increases E (piH).
Intuitively, stronger regulation increases the high type's payoﬀ because it leads buyers to
update more optimistically upon seeing a high claim. However tougher regulation hurts a low
type because it becomes costlier to mimic a high type. Now consider expected equilibrium
proﬁt, E (Π) = xE (piL) + (1− x)E (piH):
Proposition 3. Expected proﬁt is quasiconvex in φ and minimized at φ = φ1. In addition:
i) If L < q˜, expected proﬁt is maximized by φ∗ ≥ φ0.
ii) If L ≥ q˜, expected proﬁt is maximized by either φ∗ = 0 or φ∗ ≥ φ0.
A small increase in regulation can either beneﬁt or harm the monopolist, depending upon
how existing regulation φ compares with φ1. In addition, it is straightforward to see from
(12) that φ ∈ (0, φ0) is strictly dominated under an expected proﬁt objective. This implies
that the punishment should never be paid in equilibrium. Then, given the convexity of
pi∗(q), full separation with φ∗ ≥ φ0 is always weakly optimal. Intuitively, strong regulation
allows the ﬁrm to extract buyer surplus more eﬀectively when it has high quality. Hence,
if the monopolist could credibly commit to eﬀective self-regulation, Proposition 3 implies
that it would weakly prefer to avoid using false advertising. Such self-regulation might
be acceptable to buyers because in some circumstances the monopolist's preferred level of
punishment coincides with that of buyers e.g. when L < qˆ and H < q˙(L). This may
oﬀer some support for Europe's industry-led regulation. However, in other circumstances
self-regulation would go against buyers' preferences e.g. when L < qˆ and H > q˙(L). Here,
contrary to any concerns that self-regulation may be too lax, the monopolist's preferred level
of punishment is strictly higher than buyers'.
4.3 Total Welfare
We now consider total welfare. Initially, suppose that the punishment, φ, is in the form of a
ﬁne which is as valuable to the policymaker as it is to the ﬁrm. Therefore using Proposition
1, we can write expected total welfare as
E(w) = x (1− y∗) [v∗ (L) + pi∗ (L)] + (1− x+ xy∗) [v∗ (qeH) + pi∗ (qeH)] . (13)
Notice that this expression is not just the summation of expected buyer surplus in (8), and
weighted ﬁrm-type proﬁts in (12), because by assumption the punishment has social value.
We now impose a regularity condition that diﬀers slightly to the one used earlier.
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Assumption 2. Let zw(ψ) = −σ′(ψ) + [2 − σ(ψ)][3 − σ(ψ)]g(ψ)/[1 − G(ψ)]. The demand
function satisﬁes either i) q˜ < ∞ and zw(ψ) > 0 for all ψ ∈ (a, b), or ii) q˜ = −∞, q˜ = ∞,zw(ψ) changes from negative to positive at exactly one value of ψ ∈ (a, b), and limψ→a σ(ψ) =
−∞.
Assumption 2 ensures that w∗(q) ≡ v∗(q) + pi∗(q) is s-shaped in quality, with
qˆw = sup
{
q ∈ (q˜, q˜) : zw(p∗(q)− q) > 0
}
(14)
denoting the critical quality level at which w∗(q) changes from being strictly convex to
concave. The assumption is again satisﬁed by a wide range of commonly-used distribution
functions.11
Lemma 4. Consider φ ∈ [φ1, φ0] and suppose that Assumption 2 holds.
i) When qeH < qˆw expected total welfare is strictly increasing in φ.
ii) When L < qˆw < q
e
H expected total welfare is quasiconcave in φ. There exists a threshold
L˙(qeH) < qˆw such that expected total welfare is strictly increasing in φ if L < L˙(q
e
H), but
strictly decreasing in φ if L > L˙(qeH).
iii) When L > qˆw expected total welfare is weakly decreasing in φ.
Stronger policy does not necessarily increase expected total welfare. Intuitively a monop-
olist uses its market power to restrict output below the socially eﬃcient level. An increase in
false advertising changes this output distortion in two ways. First, it lowers the credibility
of any high claim, and so forces any type with such a claim to further reduce its output
below the socially optimal level. Second however, it also induces buyers to over-estimate
a low type's quality, thereby causing the low type to increase its output. Under certain
circumstances this latter output expansion can raise welfare and dominate the former eﬀect.
11Assumption 2i holds for all demands with constant curvature, where qˆw = q˜ < ∞ such that w∗(q)
is strictly convex for q ∈ (q˜, qˆw) and linear for q ≥ q˜w. Assumption 2ii is satisﬁed by some demandswith increasing curvature, including the Normal, Weibull, and Type I Extreme Value, where qˆw solves
zw (p
∗(q)− q) = 0 such that w∗(q) is strictly convex for q < qˆw but strictly concave for q > qˆw. See Section
A of the Supplementary Appendix.
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In more detail:
∂E(w)
∂y∗
= x
[
v∗ (qeH)− v∗ (L)− (qeH − L)D(p∗(qeH)− qeH) + pi∗(qeH)− pi∗ (L)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Output expansion by a ﬁrm with q = L
+ (1− x+ xy)D(p∗(qeH)− qeH)
(
1− ∂p
∗(qeH)
∂qeH
)
∂qeH
∂y∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
Output contraction by a ﬁrm with r = H
(15)
The ﬁrst term in (15) represents the change in welfare when a low type moves from reporting
r = L and generating a total surplus of v∗ (L) + pi∗ (L), to claiming r = H and generating
a surplus of v∗ (qeH) − (qeH − L)D(p∗(qeH) − qeH) + pi∗ (qeH). This term is positive if and only
if L is above a certain threshold. Intuitively, the low type's socially optimal output level
D(−L) is increasing in L. Moreover when a low type engages in false advertising, its output
increases from D (p∗(L)− L) ≤ D(−L) to D(p∗(qeH)−qeH). Therefore if L is relatively small,
this `output expansion eﬀect' goes far beyond the eﬃcient level and so is bad for welfare.
However if L is relatively large, the output expansion eﬀect brings the low type closer to the
eﬃcient level, and so is good for welfare. The second term in (15) represents the change in
surplus generated by a ﬁrm that claims to have high quality, following a small increase in y∗.
As explained above, this is unambiguously negative because an increase in y∗ reduces the
credibility (and hence output) of a ﬁrm that reports r = H. Ceteris paribus, this `output
contraction eﬀect' is smaller when quality pass-through ∂p∗(qeH)/∂q
e
H is larger since in that
case the ﬁrm's output is less sensitive to buyers' belief about its quality.
Lemma 4 can then be understood as follows. When qeH < qˆw quality pass-through is
relatively small, such that the output contraction eﬀect dominates, and so E(w) decreases
in the level of false advertising y∗. When L < qˆw < qeH quality pass-through is relatively
stronger, and so the output contraction eﬀect is weaker. A small increase in y∗ therefore
raises welfare provided L is suﬃciently large, such that the expansion in the low type's output
is not (too) excessive. In the appendix we show that the critical threshold
L˙(qeH) = sup
{
L :
∂E(v)
∂y∗
< 0
∣∣∣∣ qeH > qˆw} (16)
is strictly below qˆw and is also (weakly) decreasing in q
e
H . Finally when L is large with
L > qˆw, an increase in the penalty can never raise welfare as the output expansion always
weakly dominates.12
12Glaeser and Ujhelyi (2010) show in a model with one ﬁrm type and naive buyers that some false
advertising always improves welfare by increasing output. Our result diﬀers in two ways. First, in our
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Now consider the implications for the optimal penalty. To ease exposition, we focus on
the (more interesting) case where L < qˆw. First, note that the policymaker will always
eliminate false advertising with φ∗ ≥ φ0 when H < qˆw. This follows from Lemma 4 because
qeH < qˆw for all y
∗ ∈ [0, 1]. For the remaining cases:
Proposition 4. Fix L < qˆw < H and suppose that Assumption 2 holds. The welfare-optimal
penalty, φ∗, is characterized as follows:
i) When L ≤ L˙(H), φ∗ ≥ φ0 such that y∗ = 0.
ii) When L ∈ (L˙(H), L˙(q¯)), φ∗ induces y∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that qeH = q∗∗ where L = L˙(q∗∗).
iii) When L ∈ [L˙(q¯), qˆw), φ∗ ≤ φ1 such that y∗ = 1 .
Proposition 4 shows that a positive level of false advertising is welfare-optimal for a non-
empty set of parameters. In line with intuition, one can also show that the optimal level of
false advertising is weakly lower than that under a buyer surplus objective. However, the
optimal level of false advertising remains increasing in the `healthiness' of the market (e.g.
L, H, and (1− x)).13
5 Endogenous Quality Investment
We now extend the main model to examine some additional eﬀects of false advertising in a
market with endogenous product quality. These eﬀects are important to consider because
the existence of false advertising may reduce the incentives to invest in product quality by
limiting the credibility of advertising. Suppose that the ﬁrm is initially endowed with low
quality L, but can upgrade to high quality H by paying an investment cost C. This cost is
drawn privately from a distribution F (C) on (0,∞), with corresponding density f(C) > 0.
The move order is then as follows. At stage 1 the policymaker commits to a penalty φ. At
stage 2 the ﬁrm learns its investment cost C, and privately chooses whether to upgrade.
It also announces its report and price. The game then proceeds as in the main model,
with buyers making their purchase decisions, and the policymaker instigating any potential
punishments. Let x∗(φ) denote the endogenous probability that the ﬁrm has low quality.
model the low type's output expansion is endogenous, and hence may be so large that it reduces welfare.
Second, since our buyers are Bayesian, false advertising by the low type decreases the high type's output,
which also reduces welfare. We also note that the way in which false advertising distorts the two types'
output is reminiscent of the output eﬀects in third-degree price discrimination (e.g. Aguirre et al 2010).
13Finally, we note that false advertising can remain optimal even when a fraction τ of the punishment is
`lost' and does not contribute to total welfare. For instance when L˙(q¯) < L < qˆw ≤ q¯ the optimal penalty
induces y∗ = 1 for all τ ∈ [0, 1]. The only diﬀerence is that when τ = 0 any φ ∈ [0, φ1] maximizes total
welfare, whereas when τ > 0 it becomes more attractive to reduce the penalties incurred, and so φ∗ = 0 is
the unique optimum.
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There always exists a trivial equilibrium in which x∗(φ) = 1. If buyers believe that
product quality is low for all reports and prices, the ﬁrm has no incentive to invest. However,
in general, there also exist other alternative PBE. Henceforth, we restrict attention to PBE
where, as before, buyer beliefs do not depend on price. Moreover whenever possible, we
select an equilibrium where the ﬁrm invests with positive probability.
Lemma 5. i) When φ = 0 all equilibria have x∗(φ) = 1. ii) When φ ∈ (0, φ0] there is a
unique equilibrium (up to oﬀ-path beliefs) satisfying our restrictions, with x∗ = 1 − F (φ) ∈
(0, 1) and r(H) = H.
Intuitively, an increase in φ induces investment by widening the gap in proﬁts earned by
high and low quality ﬁrms. In more detail, when φ = 0 buyers cannot distinguish between
high and low quality. The ﬁrm earns the same proﬁt regardless and therefore chooses not
to invest. Alternatively when φ ≥ φ0, claims are fully credible. A low quality ﬁrm reports
r = L and earns pi∗(L), whilst a high quality ﬁrm reports r = H and earns pi∗(H). Since the
gains from investing are pi∗(H)−pi∗(L) ≡ φ0, the ﬁrm upgrades if and only if C ≤ φ0. Finally
when φ ∈ (0, φ0), the level of false advertising is necessarily positive for the same reason as
in the main model. This further implies that a high quality product earns φ more than a low
quality product such that the ﬁrm invests with probability F (φ). However unlike the main
model, the probability of false advertising y∗ is not necessarily decreasing everywhere in φ.
Recall the deﬁnition qeH ≡ E(q|r = H). Intuitively, an increase in φ can enhance advertising
credibility and cause investment to increase by so much that, ceteris paribus, the net gains
from false advertising, pi∗(qeH) − φ, actually rise, and prompt a higher y∗. In his seminal
discussion, Nelson (1974) suggested that advertising policy may increase the credibility of
false advertising. Here, we formalize an even stronger relationship - policy can provide so
much credibility that parameters exist where the probability of false advertising is increasing
in the level of penalty. Nevertheless, despite any potential increase in y∗, stronger penalties
still always induce a larger expected quality, qeH . Now consider the optimal penalty:
Proposition 5. Suppose Assumption 1 holds and that L < qˆ. A buyer-orientated policy-
maker i) always sets φ > 0, and ii) sets φ < φ0 such that y
∗ > 0 provided H > q˙(L) and
f(φ0)/F (φ0) is suﬃciently small.
To understand this result, rewrite (8) from earlier using x ≡ x∗(φ) as
E(v) = v∗(L) + (H − L)v
∗(qeH)− v∗(L)
qeH − L︸ ︷︷ ︸
Price/Persuasion terms
× (1− x∗(φ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Investment term
. (17)
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The second term captures the tradeoﬀ between the price and persuasion eﬀects. As in the
main model, Assumption 1 ensures that this term is increasing in φ if and only if qeH < q˙(L).
The third term relates to a new `investment eﬀect'. A high quality product generates more
buyer surplus than a low quality product. Therefore ceteris paribus, an increase in φ is
beneﬁcial since it prompts a higher level of investment. Proposition 5 is then explained as
follows. Firstly, unlike in the main model, φ = 0 is never optimal because the ﬁrm then never
invests and so buyers get only v∗(L). Alternatively, for any φ > 0, the ﬁrm invests with
positive probability and so from (17) buyer surplus strictly exceeds v∗(L). Secondly though,
despite this new investment eﬀect, policy may still refrain from completely eliminating false
advertising. In particular, this is the case when H > q˙(L) and f(φ0)/F (φ0) is relatively
small. Intuitively the latter restriction on f(C) implies that starting from strong regulation,
φ = φ0, a small decrease in φ only has a small eﬀect on the investment probability, such that
the combined price and persuasion eﬀects dominate. Consequently, as in the main model,
false advertising can sometimes beneﬁt buyers.14
Finally, one can compare the optimal penalty with that under exogenous quality. In par-
ticular, let φ∗en denote the optimal penalty with endogenous quality, and impose a technical
condition f(φ)(H − L) < 1 to ensure it is unique. Then, to make a comparison, let x∗ (φ∗en)
be the proportion of low types under exogenous quality, and denote the associated optimal
penalty by φ∗ex. One can then prove that φ
∗
ex ≤ φ∗en, such that the optimal penalty is stronger
when quality is endogenous due to the existence of the investment eﬀect.
6 Robustness
This ﬁnal section shows how the results of the main model are robust to i) an arbitrary
number of quality types, ii) asymmetric costs, iii) more complex forms of punishments, and
iv) competition.
6.1 An Arbitrary Number of Types
Suppose there are now n > 2 quality levels, denoted by q1 < ... < qn, and that the ﬁrm has
quality qi with probability xi ∈ (0, 1). To simplify the exposition, let q2 > q˜ and qn−1 < qˆ(relaxing these assumptions is straightforward, but adds no new insights). Marginal cost
is the same for all types and normalized to zero, while ex ante expected quality is again
denoted by q¯ =
∑
xiqi. The ﬁrm may send any report from the set Q = {q1, ..., qn}, and
14Similarly, one can show that a welfare-maximizing policymaker may also refrain from completely eradi-
cating false advertising.
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the policymaker can commit to a richer punishment φ(q, r) ≥ 0, which depends on both
the ﬁrm's actual and reported qualities. We assume that the ﬁrm can only be ﬁned if it
over-reports its quality i.e. φ(q, r) = 0 for all r ≤ q. The game and move order are otherwise
unchanged.
As usual, for any particular punishment φ(q, r) there may exist a large number of PBE.
Therefore, for reasons analogous to the main model, we continue to restrict attention to
PBE in which i) r(q) ≥ q ∀q such that no type under-reports its quality, and ii) buyer
beliefs depend on the ﬁrm's claim but not its price. Notice that in any PBE satisfying
these restrictions, the punishment function φ(q, r) induces a mapping from quality types
into reports. It is then convenient to let y∗i,j be the probability that a ﬁrm of type i claims
to have quality j; hence y∗i,i denotes the probability that ﬁrm type i sends a truthful report.
Letting y∗ be the (triangular) matrix of such probabilities, we may then state:
Lemma 6. The optimal penalty can be derived in two steps:
i) First, choose the matrix of probabilities y∗ which maximizes the policymaker's objective.
ii) Second, there exists a punishment function φ(q, r) which induces the policymaker's optimal
y∗ as the unique equilibrium outcome of the game.
Thus conceptually the problem is similar to the two-type case. In particular, analogous to
Lemma 2, we can work with the matrix of report probabilities y∗, and be sure that at least
one punishment function can implement the desired y∗. Now consider optimal penalties.
Given our main model, it is not surprising that under certain conditions the policymaker
will permit some false advertising. However once there is an arbitrary number of types,
the policymaker also has to decide which quality types will be allowed to engage in false
advertising, and which quality level(s) they will mimic. To simplify the exposition we now
focus on distributions satisfying Assumptions 1i and 2i for which qˆ = qˆw = q˜
15:
Proposition 6. Suppose the match distribution satisﬁes Assumptions 1i and 2i. The optimal
report probabilities are as follows:
i) Buyer surplus. (a) When qn ≤ q˜ it is maximized by y∗i,i = 1 for all i. (b) When qn > q˜ > q¯
there exists a critical type i∗ satisfying E(q|q ≥ qi∗) ≤ q˜ < E(q|q ≥ qi∗+1), such that the
optimal solution has y∗i,i = 1 for all i < i
∗, y∗i,n = 1 for all i > i
∗, and y∗i∗,i∗ = 1− y∗i∗,n where
y∗i∗,n satisﬁes:
xi∗y
∗
i∗,nqi∗ +
∑n
i=i∗+1 xiqi
xi∗y∗i∗,n +
∑n
i=i∗+1 xi
= q˜.
15The optimal pattern of false advertising is qualitatively the same for distributions satisfying the alter-
native Assumptions 1ii and 2ii. Further details are available on request.
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(c) When q¯ ≥ q˜ it is maximized by y∗i,n = 1 for all i.
ii) Proﬁt is maximized by y∗i,i = 1 for all i.
iii) Total welfare. There exists a threshold L˙ such that: (a) When qn ≤ q˜ it is maximized by
y∗i,i = 1 for all i. (b) When qn > q˜ and qi∗ ≥ L˙ it is maximized by the buyer-optimal matrix.
(c) When qn > q˜ and qi∗ < L˙, it is maximized by y
∗
i,i = 1 for all i with qi < L˙, and y
∗
i,n = 1
for all i with qi ≥ L˙.
The policymaker induces each ﬁrm type to either report truthfully or to claim to have
the highest possible quality qn. Similar to the two-type model, in many cases one ﬁrm type
is required to randomize over its report. Whether buyers gain from false advertising depends
upon how the highest quality type qn compares with q˜. If qn ≤ q˜ the persuasion eﬀect
dominates, such that buyers are better oﬀ if the ﬁrm truthfully reveals its quality. However
if qn > q˜, the highest type has a lot of market power, and so lower types are pooled with
it to generate a beneﬁcial price eﬀect. In order to minimize the negative persuasion eﬀect,
this pooling is done from the top i.e. ﬁrst the qn−1 type is pooled, then the qn−2 type, and
so forth, until either E(q|r = qn) = q˜ or no more types are left to pool. Hence the optimum
has full pooling when q¯ > q˜, and semi-pooling when q¯ < q˜ < H . In the latter case, the
policymaker permits `small' lies by types close to qn, whilst forbidding `large' lies by types
at or close to q1.
Policy under a total welfare objective also depends upon whether qn ≷ q˜. When qn ≤ q˜ a
welfare-maximizing policy involves truthful advertising and so coincides with what is optimal
for both buyers and the ﬁrm. However when qn > q˜ a welfare-oriented policymaker may allow
some lower types to use false advertising in order to raise their output. As with buyer surplus,
types with quality closer to qn are more likely to be allowed to use false advertising since
their socially-optimal output levels are highest. Overall, the main insights from the two-type
model carry over into this richer multi-type environment.
6.2 Asymmetric Costs
Returning to the two-type case, we now permit the types to diﬀer in marginal costs. This
may allow the types to separate more easily by facilitating price signaling. Hence, we ﬁrst
characterize the least-cost separating equilibrium where the ﬁrm can signal by using both
its report and its price. However, as such separating equilibria necessarily involve truthful
advertising, they cannot account for false advertising. Consequently, we then use a diﬀerent
selection approach to study a version of our previous semi-pooling equilibrium with false
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advertising.16
Suppose that a product of quality q now has constant marginal cost c(q) with c′(q) ∈ (0, 1)
and c′′(q) = 0. Let pi (p, qe; i) = (p− c(i)) [1−G (p− qe)] be the proﬁt earned with price p,
expected quality qe, and actual quality i ∈ {L,H}, and denote p∗ (qe; i) = arg maxp pi (p, qe; i)
and pi∗(i) = pi (p∗ (i; i) , i; i). First, consider the least-cost separating equilibrium. Without
advertising regulation, standard results show that the low type charges its full information
price p∗(L;L), whilst the high type charges p∗(H;H) if pi∗(L) ≥ pi(p∗(H;H), H;L), and
otherwise distorts its price above p∗(H;H). To make our problem with advertising regulation
interesting, we henceforth assume pi∗(L) < pi(p∗(H;H), H;L):
Remark 2. Suppose φ > 0. At the least-cost separating equilibrium, the low type claims
r = L and charges p∗(L;L), while the high type claims r = H and charges ps(φ) where
i) If φ ≥ φ′0 ≡ pi(p∗(H;H), H;L)− pi∗(L), ps(φ) = p∗(H;H).
ii) If φ ∈ (0, φ′0), ps(φ) > p∗(H;H) and is the largest solution to pi(p,H;L)− φ = pi∗(L).
When φ = 0, the high type separates only by distorting its price. However when φ > 0,
the high type optimally issues a high report in order to directly reduce the low type's incentive
to mimic - now, if the high type charges p, the low type will not mimic if pi(p,H;L)− φ ≤
pi∗(L). Therefore when φ ≥ φ′0 the high type can separate without distorting its price, but
when φ ∈ (0, φ′0) some upward price distortion is still required. Nevertheless the high type's
separating price ps(φ), and the size of the resulting distortion, are decreasing in φ.17
To study false advertising, we now characterize an alternative semi-pooling equilibrium
in a similar style to the main model. Notice that if both types send the same report with
positive probability, they must charge the same price when sending that report. If not, buyers
would be able to infer the ﬁrm's type and the low type would wish to deviate. However, in
contrast to the main model, after making a high claim with price p and subsequent belief qe,
the payoﬀ functions of the two types now diﬀer by more than just a constant. Therefore, the
two types no longer have the same pricing incentives, and so we require a stronger equilibrium
selection approach.
Firstly, we still focus on PBE where the high type always sends a high report. Secondly,
however, we now restrict attention to PBE where given a high report, the ﬁrm always charges
the high type's sequentially optimal price. In particular, if buyers believe that on average
a ﬁrm with r = H has quality qeH , then after reporting r = H both types set a pooling
price p∗ (qeH ;H). Intuitively, since the high type is the one being mimicked, it should have
16See also Mailath et al (1993) for a number of wider arguments against the de facto selection of least-cost
separating equilibria.
17Corts (2013) makes a related point in an extension of his main model where ﬁrms are imperfectly
informed about their own product quality.
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some `leadership' in choosing its preferred pooling price. A more formal justiﬁcation for this
second restriction follows with the use of a stronger version of the Undefeated Equilibrium
reﬁnement, as proposed by Mezzetti and Tsoulouhas (2000).18 We may then state:
Lemma 7. Suppose c(H)− c(L) is not too large. There is a unique semi-pooling PBE (up
to oﬀ-path beliefs) satisfying our restrictions, in which:
i) A high type ﬁrm claims r = H and charges p∗(qeH ;H).
ii) A low type ﬁrm randomizes. With probability y∗ it claims r = H and charges p∗(qeH ;H).
With probability 1− y∗ it claims r = L and charges p∗(L;L).
- When φ ≤ φ′1 ≡ pi∗(p∗(q¯;H), q¯;L)− pi∗(L), y∗ = 1.
- When φ ≥ φ′0 = pi∗(p∗(H;H), H;L)− pi∗(L), y∗ = 0.
- When φ ∈ (φ′1, φ′0), y∗ ∈ (0, 1) and uniquely solves
pi∗(p∗(qeH ;H), q
e
H ;L)− φ = pi∗(L). (18)
iii) qeH is given by (6). Buyer beliefs are such that Pr (q = H|{r, p} = {H, p∗(qeH ;H)}) =
1−x
1−x+xy∗ and Pr (q = H|{r, p} 6= {H, p∗(qeH ;H)}) = 0.
The equilibrium is qualitatively similar to the main model, although pessimistic oﬀ-path
beliefs are now required to prevent the low type from reporting r = H but deviating to
a price p 6= p∗(qeH ;H). Note that equilibrium play varies smoothly with c(H) − c(L), and
converges to that of the main model as c(H)→ c(L).
Finally, given the similar equilibrium, we now brieﬂy comment on the implications for
policy.19 Suppose that c(H) − c(L) is not too large. Relative to symmetric costs, there is
now an additional reason to eradicate false advertising. Under asymmetric costs, a lying
low type must distort its price upwards at p∗ (qeH ;H) instead of its preferred (lower) price
p∗ (qeH ;L). This distortion provides a further loss to buyer surplus, total welfare, and ex ante
proﬁts. Nevertheless under Assumptions 1 and 2, it remains true that for certain values of L,
H, and x both a buyer- and a welfare-oriented policymaker would permit a strictly positive
level of false advertising.
6.3 More Complex Punishments
In practice, contrary to our assumption of a ﬁxed punishment φ, the punishment might for
example depend on how many units the ﬁrm sold, or on the degree to which buyers were
18In particular, ﬁx buyers' belief that on average a ﬁrm reporting r = H has quality qeH . As in the main
model, suppose that buyers interpret any oﬀ-path price as a (possible) signal of the ﬁrm's type rather than
a signal about E(q|r = H). Then provided c(H)− c(L) is not too large, the Strongly Undefeated reﬁnement
uniquely selects p∗ (qeH ;H) as the price which the ﬁrm should charge after reporting r = H.
19Full details are available on request.
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harmed. To capture these and other possibilities, we now consider a general punishment
φ (q, r, p, qe) ≥ 0, which depends on both the ﬁrm's actual and reported qualities, as well
as its price, and buyers' expectations. We assume that the ﬁrm can only be ﬁned if it
over-reports its quality i.e. φ (q, r, p, qe) = 0 if r ≤ q. Hence it is suﬃcient to work with
φ(p, qe) ≡ φ(L,H, p, qe), which we assume to be strictly positive and continuous in both p
and qe. For similar reasoning to the previous subsection, we restrict attention to PBE where
the high type reports truthfully, and where conditional on reporting r = H the ﬁrm charges
the high type's sequentially optimal price.20
Lemma 8. There exists a PBE satisfying our restrictions which is similar to the main model
except:
i) y∗ = 1 is an equilibrium if pi∗(L) ≤ pi∗(q¯)− φ (p∗ (q¯) , q¯),
ii) y∗ = 0 is an equilibrium if pi∗(L) ≥ pi∗(H)− φ (p∗ (H) , H),
iii) If some y∗ ∈ (0, 1) solves pi∗(L) = pi∗(qeH)−φ (p∗ (qeH) , qeH), then it is also an equilibrium,
iv) Buyer beliefs are
Pr (q = H|{r, p} = {H, p∗(qeH)}) =
1− x
1− x+ xy∗ and Pr (q = H|{r, p} 6= {H, p
∗(qeH)}) = 0
When a ﬁrm reports r = H and is believed by buyers to have quality qeH , it still charges
the same price as in the main model, p∗ (qeH), despite the more general penalty, φ(p, q
e).
Intuitively, since the high type never incurs the penalty, its sequentially optimal price is not
aﬀected by the precise form of φ(p, qe). Consequently equilibrium play is almost identical
to that in Proposition 1, with the only diﬀerence that for a general φ(p, qe), y∗ is not nec-
essarily unique. Nevertheless uniqueness can be guaranteed with a regularity condition that
pi∗(z) − φ (p∗ (z) , z) strictly increases in z. Overall, we can again view the policymaker as
choosing a lying probability y∗ to maximize its objective function. The desired y∗ can then
be implemented by using a ﬁxed ﬁne φ or a more ornate ﬁne φ (p, qe) with no diﬀerence in
ﬁnal outcome.
6.4 Competition
This ﬁnal subsection introduces competition into the main model. Suppose an established
incumbent, I, with quality qI , competes against an entrant, E, with quality, qE. Product
diﬀerentiation is modeled using a Hotelling line such that a buyer with location z ∈ [0, 1]
20As before with asymmetric costs, the types do not necessarily have the same pricing incentives when
r = H, but the high type's sequentially optimal price is again uniquely selected by Mezzetti and Tsoulouhas's
(2000) Strongly Undefeated Equilibrium reﬁnement provided that φ (p, qe) ≥ φ(p∗(L), L) and that φ (p, qe)
is not too sensitive to changes in p and qe.
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can gain UI(z) = qI − pI − tz or UE(z) = qE − pE − t(1− z) from trading with the respective
ﬁrms. While the incumbent's product quality is known, the entrant's quality is private
information. Speciﬁcally, the entrant's product quality equals L with probability x ∈ (0, 1)
and H > L with probability 1−x, such that the entrant's ex ante average quality level equals
q¯ = xL+(1−x)H. Let all marginal costs be zero, and the buyers' outside option be suﬃciently
poor such that buyers always buy. The game then proceeds with i) the policymaker publicly
selecting φ, ii) the entrant learning its quality and issuing a report r ∈ {L,H}, iii) the
entrant and incumbent simultaneously selecting their prices, pE and pI , iv) buyers making
their purchase decisions, and v) the policymaker administering any potential punishments.
To begin, consider a benchmark case where qE is public information. The Nash equilib-
rium price charged by ﬁrm i ∈ {I, E} is then
p∗i (qi, q−i) =

0 if qi ≤ qi˜
t+
(
qi−q−i
3
)
if qi ∈
(
qi˜, q˜i
)
qi − q−i − t if qi ≥ q˜i
(19)
where qi˜ = q−i − 3t and q˜i = q−i + 3t. Intuitively, when qi ≤ qi˜ ﬁrm i is uncompetitive soits price is driven down to marginal cost. When instead qi ∈ (qi˜, q˜i), both ﬁrms are active.Here, an increase in qi shifts out ﬁrm i's demand curve at the expense of its rival, prompting
ﬁrm i to charge more and its rival to charge less. Finally, when qi ≥ q˜i, ﬁrm i's product
is so strong that it monopolizes the whole market; ﬁrm i then sets its price such that the
marginal buyer is indiﬀerent about buying from it. In addition, one can show that ﬁrm i's
equilibrium proﬁt, pi∗i (qi, q−i), is increasing in its own quality qi, and decreasing in that of its
rival q−i.
Now let the entrant's product quality be private information. As consistent with the
main model, we restrict attention to PBE where i) the high entrant type always issues a
high report, and ii) buyer beliefs do not depend on price.
Lemma 9. There exists a unique semi-pooling equilibrium (up to oﬀ-path beliefs) satisfying
our restrictions, in which:
i) The probability with which a low quality entrant reports r = H, y∗, is the same as in
Proposition 1ii) after replacing pi∗(z) with pi∗E(z, qI).
ii) The ﬁrms charge p∗E(L, qI) and p
∗
I(qI , L) respectively if the entrant reports r = L; and
p∗E(q
e
H , qI) and p
∗
I(qI , q
e
H) if the entrant reports r = H.
iii) Buyer beliefs are similar to Proposition 1iii) i.e. following a report r = H, buyers expect
the entrant to have quality qeH =
xy∗L+(1−x)H
1−x+xy∗ .
There exists a natural semi-pooling equilibrium which is qualitatively the same as under
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monopoly where a low quality entrant randomizes between lying and reporting truthfully.
Buyers update their beliefs about entrant quality accordingly, and conditional on those
beliefs, the two ﬁrms charge Nash equilibrium prices.
Now consider the optimal penalty, starting with an industry proﬁts objective. One can
verify that both the entrant and the incumbent weakly prefer y∗ = 0, with a strict preference
whenever L < q˜E. Hence, like the monopoly case, an industry self-regulator would choose to
completely eliminate false advertising with the use of a tough policy φ∗ ≥ φ0 ≡ pi∗E(H, qI)−
pi∗E(L, qI).
We now consider buyer surplus and total welfare. Here, in order to demonstrate that a
policymaker may still permit a positive level of false advertising, it is suﬃcient to focus on
the case where the entrant always has positive market share, with L ≥ qE˜. First, considerbuyer surplus.
Proposition 7. When L ≥ qE˜ the buyer-optimal level of false advertising y∗ is the same asin Proposition 2 after replacing qˆ and q˙(L) with q˜E.
To understand this result, write
∂E(v)
∂y∗
= x [v∗(qI , qeH)− (qeH − L)D∗E(qeH , qI)− v∗(qI , L)]
− (1− x+ xy∗)∂q
e
H
∂y∗
[
D∗I (qI , q
e
H)
∂p∗I(qI , q
e
H)
∂qeH
+D∗E(q
e
H , qI)
∂p∗E(q
e
H , qI)
∂qeH
]
, (20)
where D∗I (qI , q
e
H) and D
∗
E(q
e
H , qI) are the respective equilibrium demands. The ﬁrst term is
a revised `persuasion' eﬀect which measures the change in buyer surplus generated by a low
quality entrant when it changes its report from r = L to r = H. As usual, a low type entrant
uses false advertising to induce buyers to buy too many units, at an inﬂated price. However,
false advertising now also allows the low type entrant to compete more eﬀectively, which
reduces the incumbent's price from p∗I(qI , L) to p
∗
I(qI , q
e
H). The second term is a revised
`price' eﬀect. Conditional on the entrant using a high claim, an increase in lying reduces qeH
and prompts the entrant to charge a (weakly) lower price, but allows the incumbent to select
a (weakly) higher price. This net price eﬀect need no longer beneﬁt buyers - it is beneﬁcial if
and only if the entrant's market share exceeds 1/2, which is equivalent to qeH ≥ qI . However,
in aggregate, the optimal penalty remains qualitatively similar to that under monopoly. In
particular, false advertising remains optimal when H > q˜E in order to weaken the high type
entrant's market power.
Now consider total welfare. From above, it is optimal to set φ∗ ≥ φ0 to induce y∗ = 0
when H ≤ q˜E as this is preferred by all parties. For the remaining cases, we can state:
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Proposition 8. When L ≥ qE˜ the welfare-optimal y∗ is the same as in Proposition 4 after
substituting q˜E for qˆw, and L˙E = qI + 3t/5 for L˙(H) and L˙(q¯).
This can be understood as follows. Firstly, an increase in y∗ expands the output of a low
type entrant. As with monopoly, this can either increase or decrease welfare depending on
the level of L. Secondly, an increase in y∗ reduces qeH , and therefore decreases the output
of an entrant who reports r = H. However unlike monopoly, this second eﬀect can actually
increase welfare because, under competition, the ﬁrm with the highest (expected) quality
uses its market power to restrict its output below the socially eﬃcient level. Hence when
qeH ∈ (qE˜, qI) an entrant who reports r = H actually overproduces, and so a small reductionin its output is socially beneﬁcial. The proposition then shows that the aggregate of these
two eﬀects is qualitatively similar to monopoly. False advertising can remain optimal. In
particular, false advertising is used if and only if H > q˜E and L is relatively large with
L ≥ L˙E in order to raise the output of a low type entrant.
7 Conclusions
Despite its prevalence and importance, false advertising has previously remained under-
studied. However, this paper shows how it can inﬂuence rational buyers in equilibrium.
Moreover, the paper has provided conditions under which buyers and society beneﬁt from a
positive level of false advertising due its eﬀects in counteracting market power. This ﬁnding
remains robust to the possibility of endogenous quality, arbitrary quality types, asymmetric
costs, diﬀerent forms of policy, and competition.
We hope that our paper will prompt a new research agenda on false advertising and
advertising policy in a number of directions. First, further work should extend our analysis to
understand more complex issues. For instance, we have assumed that other contractual and
reputational sources of credibility are unavailable, as consistent with buyers only being able
to assess a product's value with suﬃcient delay. Future work to consider such issues would be
valuable. Second, such a dynamic understanding would also help better transfer our ﬁndings
to empirical work. However, even our static model presents a rich set of empirical predictions
for how changes in policy should aﬀect the use of advertising, and market prices. Finally,
much work remains in building on our analysis to study other types of false advertising and
other forms of advertising policy.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. i) If q ≤ q˜ demand is zero for all p ≥ 0, so proﬁt is weakly maximizedat p∗ = 0. ii) If q > q˜ proﬁt is strictly increasing in p < a + q, therefore the optimal pricemust satisfy p∗ ≥ a+ q. At an interior solution, the ﬁrst order condition is
1− pg (p− q)/ [1−G (p− q)] = 0. (21)
a) When q ∈
(
q˜, q˜
)
the left-hand side of (21) is strictly positive at p→ a+q, strictly negative
as p → b + q, and strictly decreasing in p because 1 − G(ε) is logconcave. Hence a unique
p∗ solves equation (21). Deﬁne σ(ψ) = −[1 − G(ψ)]g′(ψ)/g(ψ)2. Diﬀerentiating (21) gives
∂p∗(q)/∂q = (1 − σ(p∗(q) − q))/(2 − σ(p∗(q) − q)), which lies in [0, 1) because logconcavity
of 1 − G(ε) implies σ(ψ) ≤ 1. b). When q ≥ q˜ the lefthand side of (21) is strictly negative
at all p > a+ q and hence p∗ = a+ q.
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof proceeds in several steps. a) Beliefs depend only on
the ﬁrm's report, so deﬁne βei = Pr (q = H|r = i) and qei = (1− βei )L+ βeiH for i ∈ {L,H}.
b) Conditional on its report and buyer beliefs, the ﬁrm's price must maximize its proﬁt. So
given a report r = i for i ∈ {L,H}, the ﬁrm charges p∗(qei ). c) As y∗ = Pr (r(L) = H),
Bayes' rule implies βeH = (1− x)/(1− x+ xy∗), and βeL = 0 if y∗ < 1. However, Bayes' rule
places no restriction on βeL if y
∗ = 1. d) y∗ must be consistent with the low type behaving
optimally. Firstly given y∗ = 0, r = L is weakly dominant iﬀ φ ≥ φ0. Secondly given y∗ = 1,
reporting r = H is weakly dominant iﬀ φ ≤ pi∗(q¯) − pi∗ (qeL) i.e. for any φ ≤ φ1 given an
appropriate oﬀ-path belief βeL. Thirdly given y
∗ ∈ (0, 1), the low type must be indiﬀerent
between r = L and r = H i.e. (5) must hold. Moreover y∗ ∈ (0, 1) implies qeH ∈ (q¯, H), such
that equation (5) cannot hold for φ /∈ (φ1, φ0), but has a unique solution for any φ ∈ (φ1, φ0).
e) Finally, given buyer beliefs, it is optimal for the high type to report r = H.
Proof of Lemma 3. Recall that y∗ strictly decreases in φ ∈ [φ1, φ0]. Using (6) and (8):
∂E(v)
∂y∗
= x
[
v∗ (qeH)− v∗(L)−
dv∗ (qeH)
dq
× (qeH − L)
]
, (22)
i) Consider L < qˆ. a) Under Assumption 1i dv∗(q)/dq, d2v∗(q)/dq2 > 0 for q ∈ (q˜, q˜), anddv∗(q)/dq = 0 for q > q˜. Hence (22) is strictly negative (positive) for qeH below (above) q˙(L) =
q˜. b) Under Assumption 1ii we have the following results. First, (22) is strictly negative when
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qeH ≤ qˆ because by assumption d2v∗(q)/dq2 < 0 for all q ∈ (q˜, qˆ). Second, (22) is strictly in-creasing in qeH > qˆ because in that region d2v∗(qeH)/dq2 < 0. Third, (22) is strictly positive for
suﬃciently high qeH . To see this, note that dv
∗(q)/dq = [1−G(p∗(q)− q)]/ [2− σ(p∗(q)− q)],
hence dv∗(L)/dq > 0, and also limq→∞ dv∗(q)/dq = 0 because limq→∞ p∗(q) − q = a and by
assumption limψ→a σ(ψ) = −∞. Therefore since v∗(q) is strictly convex for q < qˆ and strictly
concave for q > qˆ, we infer that for suﬃciently high qeH we have dv
∗(qeH)/dq < dv
∗(z)/dq for
all z ∈ (L, qeH). Rewriting (22) as x
´ qeH
L
((dv∗(z)/dq)− (dv∗(qeH)/dq)) dz shows that (22) is
strictly positive for suﬃciently high qeH . Fourth then, (22) has a unique root which we denote
by q˙(L), and is strictly negative (positive) for qeH below (above) q˙(L). Fifth, note that q˙(L) is
strictly decreasing in L because dv∗(q˙(L))/dq > dv∗(L)/dq and so (22) is strictly increasing
in L. Also note that limL→qˆ q˙(L) = qˆ. Finally since qeH increases in φ, it is immediate that
under Assumption 1 E(v) is quasiconcave in φ. ii) Consider L > qˆ. Given Assumption 1
v∗(q) is weakly increasing and concave in q ≥ qˆ, so (22) is weakly positive.
Proof of Proposition 2. i) Note that qeH ≤ q˙(L) for all φ, so by Lemma 3 E(v) is maxi-
mized at φ∗ ≥ φ0. ii) Note that qeH < q˙(L) when φ < pi∗(q˙(L))− pi∗(L), and qeH > q˙(L) when
φ > pi∗(q˙(L)) − pi∗(L). Hence from Lemma, 3 E(v) is maximized at φ∗ = pi∗(q˙(L)) − pi∗(L)
such that qeH = q˙(L). iii) Note that q
e
H ≥ q˙(L) for all φ, hence by Lemma 3 E(v) is maximized
at φ∗ ≤ φ1. Finally, Proposition 1 gives the associated optimal y∗ for each case.
Proof of Corollary 1. Using Proposition 2 optimal false advertising is
y∗ = min
{
max
{
(H − q˙(L))(1− x)
(H − q˙(L))(1− x) + q˙(L)− q¯ , 0
}
, 1
}
. (23)
Recall from the proof of Lemma 3 that q˙(L) is weakly decreasing in L. Hence (23) is weakly
increasing in L, H, and (1− x).
Proof of Proposition 3. Given E (Π) = xE (piL) + (1− x)E (piH), it is immediate from
(12) that a) E(Π) = pi∗(q¯)−xφ when φ < φ1, b) E(Π) = pi∗ (L)+(1− x)φ when φ ∈ [φ1, φ0],
and c) E(Π) = xpi∗(L)+(1−x)pi∗(H) when φ > φ0. Hence E(Π) is quasiconvex, minimized at
φ1, and cannot be maximized at any φ ∈ (0, φ0). Then for part i), φ = φ0 strictly dominates
φ = 0 because pi∗(q) is convex everywhere and strictly convex for q ∈
(
q˜, q˜
)
. For part ii)
note that pi∗(q) = a+ q for all q ≥ q˜, and hence E(Π) = a+ q¯ for any φ ∈ {0} ∪ [φ0,∞).
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Proof of Lemma 4. Recall that y∗ strictly decreases in φ ∈ [φ1, φ0]. Using equation (13):
∂E(w)
∂y∗
= x
[
w∗ (qeH)− w∗(L)−
dw∗ (qeH)
dq
× (qeH − L)
]
. (24)
i) When qeH < qˆw (24) is strictly negative because w
∗(q) is strictly convex for all q ∈
(
q˜, qˆw
)
.
ii) Consider L < qˆw < q
e
H , and deﬁne Lˇ < qˆw as the unique solution to dw
∗(Lˇ)/dq =
dw∗(qeH)/dq. First, (24) is strictly increasing in L < Lˇ and strictly decreasing in L > Lˇ.
Second, (24) is continuous in L around qˆw, and (weakly) positive at L = qˆw because by
Assumption 2 w∗(q) is weakly concave for q > qˆw. Third, (24) is strictly negative for
suﬃciently low L. To prove this, note that (24) is proportional to
w∗(qeH)−w∗(L)
qeH−L −
dw∗(qeH)
dq
.
Fixing qeH , there exists a δ > 0 such that
dw∗(qeH)
dq
> δ. Moreover
w∗(qeH)−w∗(L)
qeH−L is weakly less
than
w∗(qeH)
qeH−L , which in turn is strictly less than δ for suﬃciently low L. Fourth then, (24)
has a unique root L˙(qeH) < Lˇ, and is strictly negative (positive) for L below (above) L˙(q
e
H).
Therefore, since qeH increases in φ, E(w) is quasiconcave in φ under Assumption 2. iii) When
L > qˆw (24) is weakly positive because w
∗(q) is weakly concave for all q > qˆw.
Proof of Proposition 4. This follows directly from Lemma 4 and its proof. Note that
L˙(qeH) is weakly decreasing in q
e
H .
21 i) Since L ≤ L˙(qeH) for all y∗ ∈ [0, 1], E(w) is maximized
at y∗ = 0. ii) Since L > L˙(qeH) for q
e
H > q
∗∗, and L < L˙(qeH) for q
e
H < q
∗∗, E(w) is maximized
by the unique y∗ such that qeH = q
∗∗. iii) Since L ≥ L˙(qeH) for all y∗ ∈ [0, 1], E(w) is
maximized at y∗ = 1.
Proof of Lemma 5. Part i) follows from arguments in the text. For part ii) look for an
equilibrium in which a positive measure of types invest. Since pi∗(H) − pi∗(L) < ∞ not all
types invest, hence x∗(φ) ∈ (0, 1). Since the ﬁrm's payoﬀ following r = L is independent of
q, any ﬁrm reporting r = L must have low quality; equivalently, r(H) = H. Firstly, in any
equilibrium with y∗ = 0 a ﬁrm with q = L earns φ0 less than a ﬁrm with q = H. Secondly,
in any equilibrium with y∗ > 0 a ﬁrm with q = L earns φ less than a ﬁrm with q = H, such
that x∗(φ) = 1 − F (φ). a) Consider φ = φ0. There is clearly an equilibrium with y∗ = 0.
There is no equilibrium with y∗ > 0, since pi∗(qeH) − φ0 < pi∗(H) − φ0 = pi∗(L), such that
a ﬁrm with q = L would deviate and report r = L. b) Consider φ ∈ (0, φ0). There is no
equilibrium with y∗ = 0, since pi∗(qeH)−φ = pi∗(H)−φ > pi∗(L), such that a ﬁrm with q = L
21Under Assumption 2i w∗(q) is linear in q > qˆw = q˜ such that L˙(qeH) in invariant to q
e
H and solves
v∗ (q˜) − v∗(L) + a − pi∗ (L) + L = 0. Under Assumption 2ii L˙(qeH) is strictly decreasing in qeH because the
righthand side of (24) is strictly increasing in both L = L˙(qeH) and q
e
H .
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would deviate and report r = H. Therefore look for an equilibrium with y∗ > 0: the gain
to a ﬁrm with q = L from reporting r = H instead of r = L is pi∗(qeH) − φ − pi∗(L). Using
x∗(φ) = 1− F (φ), this equals:
pi∗
(
L+ (H − L) F (φ)
F (φ) + y∗ (1− F (φ))
)
− φ− pi∗(L). (25)
This is continuous and strictly decreasing in y∗, and is strictly positive at y∗ = 0. If (25) is
weakly positive at y∗ = 1 it is strictly positive at all y∗ ∈ [0, 1), hence there is a unique equi-
librium with y∗ = 1. If (25) is strictly negative at y∗ = 1, there exists a unique equilibrium
with y∗ ∈ (0, 1) which makes (25) equal to zero.
Proof of Proposition 5. i) The proof that φ = 0 is never optimal is given in the text after
the proposition. ii) It is enough to show that ∂E(v)/∂φ|φ=φ0 < 0. Note that for φ > 0,
pi∗ (qeH(φ)) = max {pi∗(L) + φ, pi∗ (L+ (H − L)F (φ))} , (26)
where the ﬁrst part applies when y∗ ∈ (0, 1), and the second part applies when y∗ = 1.
Equation (26) implies that for some small δ > 0, pi∗ (qeH(φ)) = pi
∗(L)+φ for all φ ∈ [φ0−δ, φ0].
Using dqeH/dφ = 1/ (dpi
∗(qeH)/dq) and equation (17), ∂E(v)/∂φ|φ=φ0 is proportional to
(H − L) (dv∗(H)/dq)− (v∗(H)− v∗(L))
(dpi∗(H)/dq) (v∗(H)− v∗(L)) (H − L) +
f(φ0)
F (φ0)
.
The ﬁrst term is strictly negative since H > q˙(L), and dominates the second term provided
f(φ0)/F (φ0) is suﬃciently small.
All remaining proofs for the paper are in Section B of the Supplementary Appendix.
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Supplementary Appendix
Section A: Further Information on Assumptions 1 and 2
This section provides further details on Assumptions 1 and 2.
Claim 1. Assumption 1 (resp. Assumption 2) ensures that buyer surplus (resp. total welfare)
is strictly convex for q ∈ (q˜, qˆ) (resp. q ∈ (q˜, qˆw)), and weakly concave for q above qˆ (resp.qˆw).
Proof. Using the deﬁnitions of p∗(q) and v∗(q) in equations (1) and (4), and also the deﬁ-
nition w∗(q) = v∗(q) + pi∗(q), we have that d2v∗(q)/dq2 ∝ z (p∗(q)− q) and d2w∗(q)/dq2 ∝
zw (p
∗(q)− q) for all q ∈ (q˜, q˜). Then note that since 1 − G(ε) is logconcave, p∗(q) − q isstrictly decreasing in q, with limq→q˜p∗(q)− q = b and limq→q˜ p∗(q)− q = a. Finally note thatfor q˜ <∞, v∗(q) and w∗(q) are both linear (and so weakly concave) for all q > q˜.
Now consider the following generalized setting in which demand equals s
[
1−G (p−q−µ
m
)]
,
where µ is a location parameter and m, s ∈ (0,∞) are stretch parameters (Weyl and Tirole
2012). This corresponds to a setting in which a mass s > 0 of buyers have unit demand, and
each buyer's valuation is given by q + µ + mε with ε distributed according to G(ε). In the
main text we focus on the case µ = 0 and m = s = 1. However in fact:
Claim 2. If Assumptions 1 and 2 hold for a demand 1 − G(p − q), they also hold for any
generalized demand of the form s
[
1−G (p−q−µ
m
)]
.
Proof. Consider Assumption 1. The market coverage point for this generalized demand is
q˜(s,m, µ) = µ+m (−a+ 1/g(a)), hence q˜(s,m, µ) <∞ if and only if q˜ <∞. Also the other
threshold q˜(s,m, µ) satisﬁes q˜(s,m, µ) = −∞ if and only if q˜ = −∞. Let σ(ψ; s,m, µ) bethe curvature of the generalized demand form. We may then write the analogue of z(ψ) for
this new demand as
z(ψ; s,m, µ) = −dσ(ψ; s,m, µ)
dψ
+ [2− σ(ψ; s,m, µ)]
[
dsG
(
ψ−µ
m
)
dψ
/
s
[
1−G
(
ψ − µ
m
)]]
.
After solving for σ(ψ; s,m, µ) and substituting it in, then canceling terms:
z(ψ; s,m, µ) =
1
m
[
−σ′
(
ψ − µ
m
)
+
[
2− σ
(
ψ − µ
m
)]
g
(
ψ−µ
m
)
1−G (ψ−µ
m
)] ∝ z(ψ − µ
m
)
.
Hence z(ψ; s,m, µ) satisﬁes Assumption 1 if and only if z(ψ) satisﬁes it. The proof for
Assumption 2 is very similar and so is omitted.
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Speciﬁc Examples
We now show that Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisﬁed by a wide range of common demand
curves. In light of Claim 2 it is suﬃcient to focus on the case s = m = 1 and µ = 0. For
further related background material, including a proof that demands with distributions 2-6
below have increasing curvature, see Fabinger and Weyl (2015) and their associated online
appendix.
1. Generalized Pareto Distribution: G(ψ) = 1 −
(
1− (1−σ)ψ
(2−σ)
) 1
1−σ
on
[
0, 2−σ
1−σ
)
for σ < 1,
and G(ψ) = 1 − e−ψ on [0,∞) for σ = 1. Special cases include the Uniform (σ = 0)
and Exponential (σ = 1) distributions. Note that q˜ = (2 − σ) < ∞ and σ(ψ) = σ. Hence
Assumptions 1i and 2i are satisﬁed, because z(ψ) = (2−σ) > 0 and zw(ψ) = (3−σ)(2−σ) >
0.
2. Normal: G(ψ) =
´ ψ
−∞
e−ψ
2/2√
2pi
dx on (−∞,∞). Note that q˜ = −∞, q˜ = ∞, and
σ(ψ) = ψ[1−G(ψ)]
g(ψ)
because g′(ψ) = −ψg(ψ). Hence limψ→a σ(ψ) = −∞. Moreover
z(ψ) ∝ 2
(
g(ψ)
1−G(ψ)
)2
− 1− ψ2. (27)
Assumption 1ii is satisﬁed because (27) is negative as ψ → −∞, is strictly increasing in
ψ ≤ 0 since g(ψ)
1−G(ψ) is strictly increasing, and is strictly positive for all ψ ≥ 0. To prove the
latter, note that for all ψ ≥ 0 we have the lower bound g(ψ)
1−G(ψ) ≥
ψ+
√
ψ2+8/pi
2
(see Duembgen
2010). In addition
zw(ψ) ∝ 6
(
g(ψ)
1−G(ψ)
)2
− 4ψ g(ψ)
1−G(ψ) − 1 = 6
(
g(ψ)
1−G(ψ)
)2
+ 4
g′(ψ)
1−G(ψ) − 1. (28)
Assumption 2ii is satisﬁed. Firstly as ψ → −∞, (28) tends to −1. Secondly (28) is strictly
increasing in ψ < −1, because g(ψ)
1−G(ψ) and g
′(ψ) > 0 are both strictly increasing. Thirdly (28)
is strictly positive for all ψ ∈ [−1, 0]. This can be proved by noting that on this interval, we
have the lower bound g(ψ) ≥
(
1− ψ2
2
)
/
√
2pi, and the upper bound 1−G(ψ) ≤ 1
2
− xg(0).
Fourthly (28) is also strictly positive for all ψ > 0. This can be proved by noting that g(ψ)
1−G(ψ)
strictly increasing implies 2
(
g(ψ)
1−G(ψ)
)2
> 2
(
g(0)
1−G(0)
)2
> 1, and also 4
[(
g(ψ)
1−G(ψ)
)2
+ g
′(ψ)
1−G(ψ)
]
>
0.
3. Weibull: G(ψ) = 1 − e−ψα on [0,∞) where α > 1. Note that q˜ = −∞, q˜ = ∞,
σ(ψ) = 1−
(
α−1
αψα
)
and limψ→a σ(ψ) = −∞. Moreover
z(ψ) ∝ (α− 1)(ψα − 1) + αψ2α and zw(ψ) ∝ 2α2ψ2α + 3α(α− 1)ψα − (α− 1) (29)
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Assumptions 1ii and 2ii are both satisﬁed, since both expressions in (29) are strictly negative
as ψ → 0, strictly increasing in ψ and strictly positive as ψ →∞.
4. Type I Extreme Value (Max version): G(ψ) = e−e
−ψ
on (−∞,∞). Note q˜ = −∞,
q˜ =∞, σ(ψ) = (eψ−1)(ee−ψ −1) and limψ→a σ(ψ) = −∞. Numerical simulations show that
Assumptions 1ii and 2ii are both satisﬁed.
5. Logistic: G(ψ) = e
ψ
1+eψ
on (−∞,∞). Note that q˜ = −∞, q˜ = ∞, σ(ψ) = 1 − e−ψand limψ→a σ(ψ) = −∞. Assumption 1ii is satisﬁed because z(ψ) ∝ e2ψ − 1, which is single-
crossing from negative to positive at ψ = 0. However Assumption 2ii is not satisﬁed since
zw(ψ) ∝ 2 + 2e−ψ, which is strictly positive everywhere.22
6. Type I Extreme Value (Min version): G(ψ) = 1 − e−eψ on (−∞,∞). Note that
q˜ = −∞, q˜ = ∞, σ(ψ) = 1 − e−ψ and limψ→a σ(ψ) = −∞. Assumption 1ii is satisﬁedbecause z(ψ) ∝ e−ψ(1 − e−ψ) − 1, which is single-crossing from negative to positive at
ψ = ln
(
−1+√5
2
)
. However Assumption 2ii is not satisﬁed since zw(ψ) ∝ 2 + 3e−ψ, which is
strictly positive everywhere.
Section B: Remaining Proofs
Proof of Lemma 6 and Proposition 6. We prove Lemma 6 and Proposition 6 together,
in several steps.
1) Given that beliefs are price-independent, E(q|r) fully determines prices. Hence y∗ is
necessary and suﬃcient to write down expected buyer surplus, total welfare, and proﬁt
(before punishments are deducted). Lemma 6i then follows (we return to 6ii later).
2) Buyer surplus. Firstly, buyer surplus is not maximized if any report r = qi<n is sent by
more than one type. To see why, consider a new triangular matrix with y′i,i =
∑n−1
j=1 y
∗
i,j and
y′i,n = y
∗
i,n for all i < n. Strict convexity of v
∗(q) ∈ (q˜, q˜) implies that buyer surplus is strictlyhigher, by Jensen's inequality. Secondly, buyer surplus is not maximized if E(q|r = qn) > q˜
and y∗i,n < 1 for some i < n. This is because the derivative of expected buyer surplus
with respect to y∗i,n is xi [v
∗(q˜)− v∗(qi)] > 0. Thirdly, buyer surplus is not maximized if
E(q|r = qn) = q˜, and there exists some j < k such that y∗k,n < 1 but y∗j,n > 0. To see this,
note that
∂y∗j,n
∂y∗k,n
∣∣∣
E(q|r=qn)=q˜
= −xk(q˜−qk)
xj(q˜−qj) . The derivative of E(v) with respect to y
∗
k,n, whilst
adjusting y∗j,n to ensure E(q|r = qn) = q˜, is proportional to
(q˜ − qj) [v∗(q˜)− v∗(qk)]− (q˜ − qk) [v∗(q˜)− v∗(qj)] ,
22Consequently a welfare-maximizing policymaker always optimally induces y∗ = 0. This is also true for
the next distribution.
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which is strictly positive since v∗(q) is strictly convex. Proposition 6i then follows.
3) Proﬁt. Since pi∗(q) is convex, and strictly so for q ∈ (q˜, q˜), a similar approach to the ﬁrstpart of the previous step shows that expected proﬁt (before punishments are deducted) is
maximized by y∗i,i = 1 for all i. Hence expected proﬁt once punishments are deducted, is
also maximized by y∗i,i = 1 for all i, and Proposition 6ii follows.
4) Total welfare. Firstly, total welfare is not maximized if any report r = qi for i < n is
sent by more than one type, and the proof is similar to that for buyer surplus. Secondly,
if E(q|r = qn) > q˜ and there exists some i < n with y∗i,n < 1, total welfare is increasing
in y∗i,n if and only if qi ≥ L˙. To see this, the derivative of E(TW ) with respect to y∗i,n is
v∗ (q˜) + a+ qi− v∗(qi)− pi∗(qi), which is positive if and only if qi exceeds a threshold (which
we call L˙). Thirdly, total welfare is not maximized if E(q|r = qn) = q˜, and there exists some
j < k such that y∗k,n < 1 but y
∗
j,n > 0. The proof closely follows the same arguments for
buyer surplus. Proposition 6iii then follows.
5) Implementation. Note that the maximum gain from false advertising is φ¯ = pi∗(qn)−pi∗(q1).
First, set φ(qi, qj) = φ¯ for all j /∈ {qi, qn} so that in any equilibrium, each ﬁrm either
reports truthfully or reports r = qn. Second, for any type i for whom y
∗
i,i = 1, also set
φ(qi, qn) = φ¯. Third, for any type i for whom y
∗
i,n = 1, set φ(qi, qn) = 0. Fourth, let
qen = (
∑n
j=1 xjy
∗
j,nqj)/(
∑n
j=1 xjy
∗
j,n). For any type i for whom y
∗
i,i = 1− y∗i,n and y∗i,n ∈ (0, 1)
(there is at most one such i) set φ(qi, qn) = pi
∗(qen)− pi∗(qi). Fifth, it is easy to see there is a
unique equilibrium outcome in which y∗ is played, and so Lemma 6ii follows.
Proof of Remark 2. a) In any separating equilibrium, buyers perfectly infer each type.
Therefore the low type optimally reports r = L and charges p∗(L,L). b) The high type
chooses p and r to maximize pi(p,H;H) subject to the no-mimicking constraint pi(p,H;L)−
φIr(H)=H ≤ pi∗(L). Clearly the optimum has r(H) = H. Then i) if φ ≥ φ′0 the optimum
has p = p∗(H;H). ii) If φ ∈ (0, φ′0), given the quasiconcavity of pi(p,H;H) and pi(p,H;L),
the no-mimicking constraint should bind. This gives two possible prices pl and ph satisfying
pl < p
∗(H;H) < ph. Since c(H) > c(L) it is easy to show that p = ph is optimal.
Proof of Lemma 7. The proof closely follows that of Proposition 1.
a) As usual let qeH = E(q|r = H) and y∗ = Pr (r(L) = H). The second restriction implies that
following r = H the ﬁrm charges p∗(qeH ;H). Bayes' rule implies that following r = H and
p = p∗(qeH ;H) the ﬁrm is believed to have high quality with probability (1−x)/(1−x+xy∗).
b) Suppose r = L is on-path. Firstly if a ﬁrm reports r = L its price must maximize proﬁt
given buyer beliefs. Secondly buyer beliefs must satisfy Bayes' rule following r = L and any
on-path price(s). Hence given the ﬁrst restriction, a ﬁrm that reports r = L must charge
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p∗(L;L), and be believed to have low quality with probability 1.
c) Necessary conditions for optimality of the low type's behavior: Firstly given y∗ = 0,
reporting r = L is weakly dominant only if φ ≥ φ′0. Secondly given y∗ = 1, reporting r = H
is weakly dominant only if φ ≤ φ′1. Thirdly given y∗ ∈ (0, 1), the low type is indiﬀerent
between r = L and r = H iﬀ (18) holds. Note that for c(H)− c(L) small, φ′1 < φ′0, and that
(18) has a unique solution y∗ ∈ (0, 1) if and only if φ ∈ (φ′1, φ′0).
d) The conditions given in the previous step are also suﬃcient for optimality of the low type's
behavior, given appropriate oﬀ-path beliefs such as those in the lemma.
e) Clearly the high type strictly prefers to report r = H and charge p∗(qeH ;H) for appropriate
oﬀ-path beliefs, such as those in the lemma.
Proof of Lemma 8. By inspection this is a valid PBE. a) Given an expectation qeH =
E(q|r = H), p∗(qeH ;H) is the high-type's sequentially optimal price (as deﬁned before the
lemma) because it never incurs the penalty. b) We now prove existence. Clearly if pi∗(q¯) −
φ(p∗(q¯), q¯) ≥ pi∗(L) and/or pi∗(H)−φ(p∗(H), H) ≤ pi∗(L) we have an equilibrium. If neither
holds, by continuity there exists a y∗ ∈ (0, 1) and hence a qeH ∈ (q¯, H) such that pi∗(qeH) −
φ(p∗(qeH), q
e
H) = pi
∗(L), therefore an equilibrium exists.
Proof of Lemma 9. We can simply repeat all the steps used in the proof of Proposition 1.
The only diﬀerence is that in the second step, each ﬁrm's price maximizes its proﬁts given
buyer beliefs and its conjecture about the other ﬁrm's price. Hence following a report r = i
for i ∈ {L,H}, the ﬁrms play Nash equilibrium prices p∗I(qI , E(qE|r = i)) and p∗E(E(qE|r =
i), qI).
Proof of Proposition 7. Under full information:
v∗(qI , qE) =
−
5t
4
+ qI+qE
2
+ (qE−qI)
2
36t
if qE ∈
(
qE˜, q˜E
)
qI +
t
2
if qE ≥ q˜E
Expected buyer surplus is E(v) = x(1− y∗)v∗(qI , L) + (1−x+xy∗)v∗(qI , qeH). Given L ≥ qE˜,v∗(qI , qE) has the same shape as v∗(q) in the monopoly problem under Assumption 1i with
qˆ = q˜E. Hence the proposition is proved in a similar way to Proposition 2, just with q˜E
replacing q˙(L) and qˆ.
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Proof of Proposition 8. Under full information, w∗(qI , qE) = v∗(qI , qE) + pi∗I (qI , qE) +
pi∗E(qI , qE) equals:
w∗(qI , qE) =
−
t
4
+ qI+qE
2
+ 5(qE−qI)
2
36t
if qE ∈
(
qE˜, q˜E
)
qE − t2 if qE ≥ q˜E
Expected total welfare isE(w) = x(1− y∗)w∗(qI , L) + (1− x+ xy∗)w∗(qI , qeH). At L ∈ [qE˜, q˜E)direct computation reveals that a) ∂E(w)/∂y∗ < 0 when qeH ≤ q˜E, and b) for qeH > q˜E,
∂E(w)/∂y∗ < 0 if and only if L < Lˆ = qI + 3t/5. Hence the claim can be proved using a
similar approach as in Proposition 4.
References
[1] Duembgen L. (2010) Bounding Standard Gaussian Tail Probabilities arXiv:1012.2063
[2] Fabinger M. and G. Weyl (2015) A Tractable Approach to Pass-Through Patterns
Working paper
[3] Weyl G. and J. Tirole (2012) Market Power Screens Willingness-to-Pay Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 127, 1971-2003
41
